U.S. Monetary Policy and Stock Prices: Should the Fed Attempt to Control Stock Prices?
The boom-bust in stock prices since the mid-1990s and growing ownership of equities by households, both in numbers and in portfolio share, focused policy-makers' and analysts' attention on the so-called "wealth effect" of stock prices on spending. It also led to calls for the Federal Reserve (Fed) to take stock prices into account in the conduct of monetary policy, in the extreme case, to target stock prices to stabilize the economy. One major study, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) , concluded:
A central bank concerned with hitting an inflation target at a given time horizon, and achieving as smooth a path as possible for inflation, is likely to achieve superior performance by adjusting its policy instrument not only to inflation or its inflation forecast and the output gap, but to asset prices as well. Chairman Greenspan's 1996 speech expressing concern for irrational exuberance began a preoccupation with stock price developments as stock prices rose and then later when they fell. Outside observers readily concluded that the Fed was concerned with stabilizing the course of stock prices. 1 Not surprisingly, when stock prices began a long period of decline in spring 2000, attacks on the Fed escalated, with critics blaming the Fed for a deliberate or unwitting effort to deflate asset prices.
2 When the Fed did begin to ease in early 2001, these critics urged 1 See Miller, Weller and Zhang (1999) , for example. The moral hazard that such a belief fostered was reinforced by the Fed's easing actions in fall 1998, due to their concern over the emerging market financial crisis-especially its manifestation in Russia's partial sovereign default. There was also a perception in the market that the risks to the U.S. financial system arising from the near failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and other hedge funds had contributed to the Fed's willingness to ease.
2 Glassman and Hassett (2001) complete the circle, in effect faulting the Fed for a fixation on stock prices in missing the downturn. They suggest that the Fed should have interpreted the fall in stock prices in spring 2000 as a sign of slowing and should have eased earlier. So it is not the fixation that was a problem, in their view, but the Fed's interpretation of the market signal.
more rapid and extensive easing to calm the equity markets. In April and May 2001, the Fed muddied the water further, justifying two 50 basis point cuts in the federal funds rate, in part, by the decline in equity prices and risk this posed for consumer spending.
This article examines whether there is an exploitable link between the Fed's main policy instrument, the federal funds rate, and stock prices, as captured by the price-earnings (PE) ratio. Second, it looks at whether such a link supports the hypotheses of advocates for a Fed response to stock price changes. The PE ratio (and its inverse, the earnings yield) is used here to assess empirical relationships and the study uses annual data to investigate low frequency long-run relationships. It begins with a brief discussion of the theoretical issues related to stock prices and Fed objectives. Section II highlights the important theoretical channel tying inflation to adverse stock price developments, a channel often ignored in theoretical discussions.
Section III addresses the simple observation that there is an inverse relationship between the PE ratio and the fed funds rate. This relationship is at the heart of expectations that the Fed could vary the fed funds rate to inversely affect stock prices. The argument here is that this correlation does not provide evidence for assessing whether the Fed can influence stock prices or is influenced by them. The inverse relationship occurs only because both stock prices and the fed funds rate are related to a third factor-inflation, not because they are related to each other. The fed funds rate is a nominal interest rate and it is the real fed funds rate that should be related to the equity yield and its inverse, the PE ratio. 3 There is no correlation between the real fed funds rate and the PE ratio, however.
Since a lack of correlation could arise from the simultaneous determination of stock prices and the real fed funds rate, causality tests and time series analysis are used to assess whether there is evidence of an exploitable relationship. The causality results are presented in section IV. Bi-directional causality from the earnings yield to the real federal funds rate is indicated. However, the signs of the relationships are opposite to those that are expected by some Fed critics who expect that an increase in the fed funds rate will lower stock prices and advocate that a rise (fall) in stock prices should raise (lower) the fed funds rate. In addition, causality evidence does not support the Fed's ability to influence the real fed funds rate.
Time series evidence shows that both the correlation and causality results are part of the broad dynamic relationship between the real fed funds rate and stock prices. More importantly, it establishes that there is a long-run positive relationship of real yields, 3 Enough readers of earlier versions of this article have been troubled by the claim that the PE ratio is a real variable to warrant immediate attention to the issue. First, the PE ratio is the ratio of two nominal measures, hence it is a relative return, not a nominal rate. For example, deflating both price and earnings by the price level to obtain real measures leaves the ratio unchanged. More important, consider a simple dividend discount model of asset valuation where, for simplicity, it is assumed that the pay-out ratio is one, and real earnings are expected to remain constant. The value of an equity claim (P) given nominal earnings is E/(i -π), where i is the required nominal return on equity and π is the expected rate of inflation and earnings growth. Thus the PE ratio is the inverse of the real rate r = (i-π) used to discount future earnings. The presence of dividends, an equity premium or growth of earnings does not alter the generality of these results. Inflation affects the PE ratio, then, only if real earnings, real growth, or the required real rate of interest used to discount earnings are affected by inflation.
including the real fed funds rate and equity yield, which implies the expected inverse market relationship between the real fed funds rate and stock prices. However, the shortrun dynamics show that an increase in the real fed funds rate has no initial effect on stock prices, hence the absence of a contemporaneous correlation. An increase in the real fed funds rate, after a lag, will raise stock prices. Third, a positive shock to stock prices leads to a fall in the real fed funds rate according to the causality tests and this is reinforced by the error correction process and the long-run equilibrium relationship found in the time series analysis. Most importantly, the time series evidence indicates a long-run equilibrium relationship between stock prices and inflation. This relationship clarifies the role in inflation in the explanation for why a rise in the fed funds rate raises stock prices and conversely why a rise in stock prices leads to a fall in the fed funds rate. It also clarifies how the Fed can influence the real fed funds rate in the short run, but has no effect on the real fed funds rate or the ability of the Fed to influence stock prices in the long run.
Section V examines whether there is evidence that the Fed has reacted to increase in stock prices by raising the fed funds rate, as proponents of a reaction now advocate.
Controlling for inflation and gross domestic product (GDP) gap in an estimate of the Taylor Rule, there is a significant negative relationship between stock prices and the nominal fed funds rate. When stock prices increase and there is a related decline in current and future inflation, the Fed systematically lowers the fed funds rate, and conversely for stock price declines. Since stock price moves are negatively related to inflation, dynamic relationships are opposite to conventional expectations. While the Fed has not, and apparently should not target stock prices, past performance in setting the fed funds rate at least reflected the correct relation: higher stock prices are an indicator of lower future inflation and support a lower fed funds rate.
Section VI provides a summary of the results and the implications. The conclusions can be briefly, if perhaps over-simplistically, anticipated. Policy actions that raise the fed funds rate to lower future inflation will, if successful, also raise stock prices. To react to the stock price rise by further tightening would destabilize the achievement of inflation and/or output goals. Second, other factors such as changes in tax policy or technology that could boost the rate of return to capital and thereby raise stock prices also lower future prices, other things equal. To tighten monetary policy in the face of favorable inflation developments would destabilize efforts to foster growth and maintain price stability. It is well known that adding new targets for policy-makers without increasing the number of instruments creates new trade-offs and compromises the effectiveness of policy. 4 In this case, the problem would be worse because advocates of a stock price response propose targeting increasing stock prices as a source of higher future inflation, when in fact higher stock prices are typically an indicator of forces that are slowing inflation.
I. The Theoretical Issues
The central theoretical issue in this article is the relationship of stock prices to inflation.
Proponents of a Fed reaction have in mind models in which a rise in stock prices boost wealth and thereby create a wealth effect raising consumption. The presence of this wealth effect and of its strength are the subjects of a growing literature that goes beyond this paper. A second literature concerns the effect of inflation on stock prices. With neutrality of money, the conclusion of that literature is that inflation does not affect stock
prices. Yet, as Bakshi and Chen (1996) note, a negative correlation between stock prices and inflation is one of the most commonly accepted empirical facts in financial economics. 5 There is a theoretical literature that explains this correlation as arising from the non-neutrality of the tax system, though Bakshi and Chen ignore such arguments.
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Higher inflation boosts effective tax rates, lowering real after-tax returns on investment and thereby lowering stock prices. Similarly, lower stock prices affect the real cost of capital, investment, output and prices. These two channels are expected to dictate the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices and between stock prices and the objectives of the Fed. Whether there is a wealth effect is not the issue, so long as it is relatively weak, and that is the alternative hypothesis here. The federal funds rate, like other nominal rates, includes an inflation premium. If stock prices are inversely related to inflation, then there will be an inverse relationship between stock prices or the PE ratio and nominal fed funds rate, even if there were no relationship between the real fed funds rate and stock prices.
5 Sharpe (2002) provides recent evidence using quarterly data from 1983 through I/2001 and Tatom (2002) also finds such a significant negative relationship using monthly data from July, 1954 through January, 2001 In their extensive review of the literature, the negative correlation of stock prices and inflation arises from pro-cyclical real interest rates, and hence counter-cyclical stock prices, along with pro-cyclical inflation.
None of the models they review are based on non-neutralities arising through the tax system.
The theoretical basis of the inverse relation of stock prices and inflation is the nonneutrality of the tax system for income from capital. For example, the taxation of corporate income based on income measures that use historical cost depreciation is one possible reason for an adverse effect of inflation on equity prices. Inflation raises the future replacement cost of capital, but not future cost for tax purposes. As a result, future earnings are overstated and this will boost taxes. Equity prices discount higher future taxes resulting in lower equity prices relative to current earnings. 7 Thus, higher future prices will raise measured earnings and lower economic earnings via the tax effect. Both factors will lower the price-earnings ratio. In an earnings-discount model, a rise in inflation will raise the observed equity premium (due to the income measurement error and to a rise in the true equity premium). Second, as Barro (1996) and others have explained, higher inflation lowers true earnings growth because it raises the cost of capital, which lowers the optimal capital-labor ratio, slowing capital formation and income growth. These two effects will lower the PE ratio.
Hess and Lee (1999) argue that the relationship between stock prices and inflation depends on the source of inflation. In their view, aggregate demand shocks can boost inflation and stock prices but are neutral in their long-run effects on output and stock prices. In contrast, adverse supply shocks, which slow output and raise prices, in contrast, lower the return to capital and thereby lower stock prices, inducing a negative 7 See Feldstein (1980) or Tatom and Turley (1976) , for example. Fama (1981) prices, but they fail to point out that this effect is more than offset within two quarters.
Thus both demand and supply shocks give rise to a reduction in stock prices in their work, though they focus on an initial effect, which appears to differ for the two sources.
This distinction is not pursued here because there is no theoretical or empirical basis for a concern for this difference in the current context. (2002) explicitly tests whether a long run equilibrium, or cointegrating, relationship found in monthly data for inflation and the earnings yield, the same as below, differs depending on the source of inflation and rejects the hypothesis that it is different. Specifically, inflation that is not systematically related to energy price shocks has the same negative effect on stock prices as does energy-price-shockbased inflation.
funds rate, then the correlation between the two measures is expected to be negative.
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Another important question is how to measure the stock price to which the Fed may react or that is influenced by Fed activity. The choice here is to use the PE ratio for the S&P 500, a broad index typically used to capture movements in aggregate stock prices. 10 The PE ratio is based on an average of quarterly data, which are the endof-quarter stock price relative to the past four quarters' earnings. Thus, earnings are largely predetermined and movements in the yield reflect the change in stock prices.
This is the main reason researchers use it as a measure of stock prices. The earnings yield, the inverse of the PE-ratio, also is more readily comparable to other yields. It is movements in stock prices relative to earnings that are of interest in assessing price movements that are of concern to investors or to policy-makers. There is also a strong negative correlation between annual changes in the S&P stock price index (logarithm of average of daily figures) and annual changes in the earnings yield (-0.74). The discussion below concentrates on the use of the earnings yield, though differences in key results using stock prices are indicated. Figure 1 shows the nominal federal funds rate and the 9 Rigoban and Sack (2001) focus on this problem and provide a useful way of dealing with it based on the heteroskedasticity of shocks to stock prices and the three-month Treasury bill rate. They find a positive correlation between stock prices and the three-month Treasury bill rate and interpret this as due to a Fed reaction. One study of the effect of monetary policy on stock returns, Booth and Booth (1997) , shows that returns on stocks are inversely related to monetary policy variables, especially the fed funds rate, even controlling for business condition proxies. Their results hold for both expansions and contractions, contrary to the finding of Jensen et al. (1996) , who find such an effect for contractions only when using the discount rate as the policy variable. Earlier studies argued that monetary policy affected stock returns by affecting business condition variables, such as dividend spreads, default spreads and term spreads. See Fama and French (1989) for the classic statement of this argument. 10 Shen (2000) uses the S&P PE ratio as a measure of stock prices and its inverse as the earnings yield. Shen follows Campbell and Shiller (1998) , in this regard, and is primarily interested in the predictive content of the PE ratio for future stock prices. Interestingly, Shen, following his own work and others, advocates the use of the earnings yield less a nominal interest rate measure as a predictor of future stock prices. The arguments below apply to this mix of a real yield and nominal interest rate, in particular, the sensitivity of both to inflation.
earnings yield. The real federal funds rate (based on the consumer price index) is also shown. 11 The nominal federal funds rate appears to be positively related to the earnings yield, so that a higher federal funds rate is associated with lower stock prices. The simple correlation coefficient for the two measures (Table 1) is positive and statistically significant at a conventional 5 percent level. The first-differences in the federal funds rate and in the earnings yield are also significantly correlated (Table 2 ).
There is a clear pattern to the fed funds rate and earnings yield in Figure 1 : both measures generally rose until the early 1980s and then generally fell. 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 7 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9
Percent F e d e r a l f u n d s r a te S & P e a r n in g s / p r ic e r a t io R e a l f e d e r a l f u n d s r a te 11 The data used are from the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers (2001) and their monthly publication, Selected Economic Indicators. The federal funds rate is the annual average of monthly averages of daily figures. The CPI is also the average of monthly data, so the real fed funds rate is the annual average fed funds rate less annual inflation. The ex post real rate assumed to be a reliable indicator of the ex ante rate. A test of whether actual inflation is a suitable measure for anticipated inflation was conducted using the biannual Livingston Survey forecasts of inflation and comparable year ahead measures of actual inflation from 1959 through 2000. An F-test of the joint hypothesis for whether the Livingston forecast is unbiased and has a unit coefficient in forecasting actual inflation is 0.32, which is not significant; the five-percent critical value (2,83) is 3.11. The individual t-statistics for the components of this hypothesis are each less than one. 
(CPI)
Critical value (5 percent): 0.31; insignificant correlation in bold.
irst-differences (Table 2) show the same significant lationships. T t hip be und E ratio arises from a common third fa . The role of inflation in producing the ation between the federal funds rate and the earnings yield is reinforced by the fact elation between the real federal funds rate and stock prices is near zero, not ositive (-0.07).
The correlation coefficients for the f 12 re his suggests that he relations ctor, inflation tween the fed f s rate and the P correl that the corr significantly p The correlation between changes in the real federal funds rate and the earnings yield is also essentially zero (0.05). It appears that the Fed has had no influence on asset prices for the past 40 years, at least on a contemporaneous, or within the year, basis.
The positive relationship for the fed funds rate and the earnings yield in Figure 1 apparently arises from the fact that during periods when inflation was higher, nominal interest rates were higher and stock prices were lower. Controlling for inflation, changes in the federal funds rate have had no effect on stock prices.
There are two other points about the inflation correlation coefficients worth noting. First, the real federal funds rate is only marginally related to inflation at best, according to these simple statistics. A negative correlation might be expected to result from the construction of the real rate or from a policy-related rise (fall) in the real federal funds rate that the earnings yield, one and two period leads and lags of each measure were added to the correlation period-ahead earnings yield. This suggests that a higher real federal funds rate in the current period will raise stock prices two years later, not the result expected by proponents using monetary policy to stabilize the stock market. All other lead/lags had insignificant correlation coefficients. The same pattern is revealed in the causality tests below, but controlling for inflation, it becomes insignificant, suggesting that the literature and provide their own evidence indicating that the effects of asset prices on inflation are not 14 To check for significant positive leading or lagging relationships between the real federal funds rate and matrix. The results reveal a significant negative correlation between the lagged real federal funds rate and the onethat higher fed funds rate lead to lower fed funds rates only because they lower inflation.
III. Causality Tests
To test for causality, Granger causality tests for all four variables in Tables 1 and 2 we conducted for lags up to five years. re ot gs ausality ch pair using three lags. The last three columns in the table report the sults of more detailed examination of the significant lagged independent variables and ive ed is shown in the last column (from zero to the number indicated). Table 3 shows that there is bi-directional causality between the earnings yield and both 15 With only one lag, the absence of causality cann be rejected for any pair of variables. Adding two or three lags resulted in increasing numbers of rejections of the absence of causality, but the results with four or five la were the same as with three lags. The first three columns of Table 3 show the c test results for ea re the sign of their effects. For the Granger-causality column, only significant lagged dependent variables are included and these are found from searches of the auto-regress properties of each dependent variable. The number of lags is indicated in the first entry for each equation in the last column. The Granger causality equations are also estimated including current and past inflation terms to control for the influence of inflation in accounting for the causality. These results are reported in the penultimate column and the number of significant inflation lags includ the federal funds rate and the real federal funds rate. Each of the latter two variables causes inflation, according to the evidence. Before examining the causal relationships in more detail, it is important to note the evidence on the absence of causality. First, the evidence shows that the Fed cannot control the real federal funds rate, the primary 15 For asset prices, it is only innovations in policy or economic performance that should matter, and t only contemporaneously. The vector-error-correction evidence below may be more pertinent for assessing the effects of shocks in one measure on the other. hen channel for the influence of monetary policy, at least in a fed funds rate-targeting -r that . In nds rate, but it is consistent with increases in the fed funds rate ducing inflation with a two-year lag. 17 framework. The causality tests cannot reject the absence of causality either from the fed funds rate to the real fed funds rate or vice versa. 16 Second, the evidence cannot reject the absence of causality from inflation to the earnings yield or the reverse; movements in stock prices do not cause inflation and stock prices do not affect inflation, in a Granger causal sense at least. There is a relationship between inflation and stock prices indicated in the table, however, and this relationship is discussed below. Third, the absence of causality from the nominal or real federal funds rate to inflation cannot be rejected, but as noted, the evidence supports the reverse direction of causality. Thus it would appea inflation does not cause a reaction by the Fed, but movements in the nominal (and real) fed funds rate cause inflation.
A closer look at the causality tests can reduce the incredulity these results may create particular, the only significant lag on the fed funds rate is the second lag and the sign of its effect on inflation is negative. The evidence suggests that inflation does not cause the Fed to change the fed fu re fed funds rate. The absence of causality from inflation to the nominal fed funds rate does not hold up when the e together, these results suggest that most of the variation in the federal funds rate reflects a reaction to 16 In tests that add current and lagged inflation terms to a Granger test equation, reported in the last two columns of Table 3 , a rise in the fed funds rate is shown to cause a rise in the real fed funds rate, but the reverse is not the case. 17 Tests that add current inflation to the test equations further clarify the relationship of inflation and the current period inflation rate is included in the estimate. In the reverse case, however, there is no positiv effect of inflation on the real fed funds rate even when the current inflation rate is included. Taken inflation aimed at maintaining the real fed funds rate, not changing it or allowing it to be changed by inflation. Each lag remains significant, however, with the second lag having a coefficient of -0.379 (t = -2.83) and the third lag having a coefficient of 0. 234 (t = 2.14). As noted in Table 3 , the sum is not different from zero once inflation is taken into account. 18 stock prices. In the case of the transitory effect of the nominal fed funds rate on stock prices, the effect is positive, contrary to the expectations of proponents of a Fed reaction to stock price increases.
Stock prices also cause the fed funds rate according to the causality tests. The causality tests in the second and fourth rows of Table 3 show that a rise in stock prices (fall in the earnings-yield) will be followed two years later by a significant fall in the fed funds rate.
or the real fed funds rate, the causality result is slightly different, with an initial rise in sts, a Fed action to stock prices. A higher fed funds rate raises stock prices, though this effect ck F the fed funds rate a year later being followed by an offsetting fall in the real fed funds rate in the second year. When the inflation rates are added to the Granger causality te the results are more uniform and indicate that only the effect two years later is statistically significant and that higher stock prices lead to lower real and nominal fed funds rate two years later. This is strongly at odds with the direction of causality advocated by proponents of a Fed reaction. Thus, the evidence on existing relationships contradicts both of the conventional hypotheses advocated by the proponents of re arises completely from the effects of the funds rate on inflation. In turn, a higher sto price leads to a fall in the fed funds rate and this effect is significant, whether or not inflation is included in the test equation.
19 Thus the causal link tying a rise in stock prices to a subsequent fall in the real fed funds rate arises from a future fall in inflation.
IV. Time Series Evidence
The correlation results provide an overview of the issues and the causality tests suggest a link from movements in stock prices to the real fed funds rate, but it is possible to test the lationship of the federal funds rate and equity prices more fully using time series his level ing a re analysis. First, it is necessary to identify the time series behavior of each series. All four measures in Table 1 Johansen's method was used to examine whether bivariate pairs of the earnings yield, ta n for the optimal lag structure found om Likelihood Ratio tests. The optimal lags were found assuming one potential and funds rate.
nominal federal funds rate, real federal funds rate and inflation are cointegrated. The Schwartz criterion indicates in each case that for five alternative specifications of trends in the data and intercepts in the potential cointegrating equations (CE), the best specification is that without an intercept and trend. The various specifications are: no data trend, with or without an intercept in the CEs, a linear trend in the data with an intercept in the CE and with or without a trend in the CE, and a quadratic trend in the da with both an intercept and a trend in the CE. The best specification-no trend or intercept in the CE-obtains for the model with specifications of the lagged differences in the variables ranging from one to four lags. onship The significant vector error correction (VEC) models are indicated in Table 5 . 21 The significant cointegrating vectors are indicated in C funds rate. For a long-run equilibrium value of the real fed funds rate of two percent, t long-run equilibrium earnings yield is about eight or the equilibrium PE-ratio is 12.
The long-run relation provides strong support for the existence of the market relati in which a rise in stock prices reduces the real fed funds rate, and conversely a rise in the fed funds rate lowers the earnings yield. 21 To check the robustness of the results for the earnings yield, tests of whether the log of the S&P price index is cointegrated with the nominal or real fed funds rate were conducted. The tests indicate that, cointegration. The optimal specifications have an intercept and no trend in the CE. However, for both variables, the optimal VEC specification has one lag and the trace test indicates significant the t-statistic for the CE coefficient on either fed funds rate measure is not statistically significant (1.43 and 1.81, respectively). In addition, the impulse response functions show that a positive shock to the fed funds rate has no effect on the stock price until two years later, then a negative effect for years two and three and subsequently the effect turns increasingly positive. A positive shock to the real fed funds rate also has no effect on the stock price until year three, when it begins to be increasingly positive as well. This is the same result as shown in the top panel of Figure 2 for the earnings yield below, where the positive stock price (negative earnings yield) effect appears in year three and beyond. The stock price measure is poorly conditioned and should be measured in real terms or relative to earnings to control for the strong positive trend, though unit root tests reject a trend and a trend is not indicated in the specification tests for the CE. Nonetheless, the results support those in the test and the use of the earnings yield as an inverse measure of the stock price.
The second CE in Table 5 indicates that there is a long-run negative relation between inflation and stock prices, as indicated in the correlation analysis and as hypothesized.
Together with the first CE, there is an ied third long-run relation between the real fed funds rate and inflation. Specifically, each percentage point of inflation is associated with a 38 basis point rise in the real f ed neutrality of real rates with respect to inflation and with the marginally significant egative contemporaneous correlation for first-differences of the two measures ( This significant EC term also indicates that a positive shock to the real fed funds rate will sig orr r the real ed fund ifi the E term from the second CE in the inflation equation indic a posit ck to the earnings yield or fall in inflation will cause a rise in the earnings yield and a fall in inflat error correction for inflation and a strong negative effect of stock prices on inflation. In particular, a positive shock to the earnings yield (a decline in stock prices) causes a rise in inflation.
It is im to note sality eans a systematic time sequencing of deve Thus, idence i iste t w es in lly e d inflation lowering stock prices before the inflation increase is observed. The result is also consistent with the notion that a rise in stock prices, which lowers the earnings yield and cost of capital, can permanently lower prices. Both the real federal funds rate and bit error correction properties, but the earnings yield does not. The earnings ect to inflation and exhibits momen a n to its ast sho e series evidence on causal relationships between the real fed funds rate and the earnings yield (stock prices) reinforces the causality results in rejecting the conventional view. Table 6 provides a summary of these differences. The time series evidence shows a dominant long-run market response, but it is capable of reconciling the correlation and simple causality results as well. The time series results find a long-run equilibrium positive relationship between the earnings yield and real fed funds rate, consistent with the expectation of a positive link between real yields across the maturity spectrum and with the expected market resp However, the error correction terms in the VEC model show a bi-directional pattern that is precisely the opposite of that expected in the conventional view and identical to tha found in the causality tests. The EC effec onse. t t indicates that a rise in the real fed funds rate ces in Table 6 is possible using the impulsesponse function results below.
will raise stock prices and a rise in stock prices will lower the fed funds rate. Both reactions presumably arise because of the link between stock prices and inflation. When stock prices rise, inflation improves and the Fed apparently eases, while increases in the fed funds rate suggest lower subsequent inflation, inducing a subsequent rise in stock prices. Some clarification of the differen re
Implications of the Time Series Model for Shocks
he real federal funds rate, the earnings yield and inflation on the three variables. Figure 2 provides impulse-response patterns of the effects of shocks to each variable on the other measures. In the top left panel, the principal result is that a one-standard deviation rise in the real federal funds rate has no effect on the earnings yield for two years and a negative effect in year three and beyond. Over time, such a shock will lower the earnings yield by about 70 basis points. This is precisely the opposite of the effect expected by most The VEC model can be used to illustrate some of the dynamic effects of shocks to t analysts who advo ds rate to stabilize the equity mark However, the initial pattern supports the absence of a contemporaneo stock prices and the real fed also a negative dynamic relation between the real funds rate and the earnings yield that indicates that a fall in stock prices can induce a fall in the real funds rate contemporaneously and one year later. This is the same as the dynamic effect expected by proponents of a Fed reaction and it is the same as the effect observed after one year in the simple causality results above (Table 3 ). There the effect is not statistically significant when inflation is taken into account, however; the only significant effect is a positive one that occurs with a two-year lag.
The error-correction term for the effect of a rise in the earnings yield on the real fed funds rate in the second column on the left in Table 4 also shows the positive causal link from a positive shock to the earnings yield to the real fed funds rate. Note that inflation has little or no effect on the real funds rate in the s a large positive effect on inflation.
This response is also indicated in the long-run equilibrium relationship. These results support the positive long-run relationship between the real fed funds rate and the earnings yield, which shows the long-run character of the relationship un the market response. This relationship indicates that an increase in the earnings yield wil permanently raise the real fed funds rate, induc p However, the direction of causality is the opposite of the conventional view. Second, a positive shock to the real fed funds rate will rotate the long-term relation between yields, raising stock prices. This effect occurs with a three-year delay, however. The same sign of the effect is indicated by the EC term for the first equation in the left panel of Table 5 - earnings yield and inflation. These imply that the earnings yield in the long run is agai about four (3.976) times the real fed funds rate (t = 4.45). Thus these results also su a long run link from the longest to shortest real yields. These CE results also are nearly identical to those presented above for bivariate relations. The key difference between VEC model for these CEs and those for the bivariate case is n pport the that, in the three variable stem, there is a potential response of inflation to the real fed funds rate. This response ove real fed funds rate-is a long-run equilibrium relationship.
Impulse-Response
econd, the error correction term, impulse-response function and earlier simple causality vidence show that this relationship arises in a dynamic context from shocks to stock prices c posite change in the real fed funds rate. Positive shocks to the real fed funds rate, with a lag (see Tables1- The coefficient on the error correction term for the second cointegrating relationship in Equation 1 above is -0.234, but it is not statistically significant (t = -1.61). In the impulse-response experiment, a onet standard deviation shock to the real federal funds rate ( 2.015 percentage points) reduces inflation by abou 0.5 percentage points initially and after about five years. Figure 2 , function, and the simple causality result (Table 3) .
graph (top left) in
According to the latter evidence, the significant positive effect of the real fed funds rate on stock prices occurs only due to inflation, which is reduced by an earlier increase in the real fed funds rate. Thus, increases in stock prices can be indicators of past success in attempting to control inflation, or of other forces reducing inflation. They are not sour or indicators of higher inflation currently or in the future.
Despite the absence of an exploitable link between stock prices and policy, it is possible that equity prices already have had a systematic effect on policy-makers' efforts to set the fed funds rate in the past. To examine this, the Taylor Rule [see Taylor (1993) The statistically significant information from the earnings yield for the federal funds rate is found to include a temporary contemporaneous effect that disappears one year later but is permanent after two years. The temporary and permanent effects are nearly the same
The estimate includes a significant first order autoregressive term whose coeffic 0.683 (t = 4.48).
(2 The sign of the relationship is again the opposite of that advocated by proponents of a central bank response to stock prices. The dynamics show that, given the inflation rate and GDP gap, a rise in stock prices (fall in the earnings yield) will induce a cut in federal funds rate within the year. This effect is consistent with the simple causality evidence and the impulse-response results observed in the time series results above (bottom panel on left in Figure 2 ). It is also consistent with the long-run relation between the real fed funds rate and stock prices and with the error correction result in Table 6 . The 1981 variable has no effect on the estimates, but without it, the stability of the coefficients in recursive estimates varies considerably and when it is included, the coefficients show little change.
One might suspect that the sign of the stock price relationship reflects reverse causality. The evidence in Table 3 indicates that causality runs from the earnings yield to the fed funds rate with this positive relation 27 and rejects the reverse direction of causality when inflation is included as it is here. 28 Including stock prices has a material effect on the response of the fed funds rate to a rise in inflation. The equilibrium effect of a rise in inflation on the federal funds rate in equation 2, imposing the long-run relation between inflation and the earnings yield on the right hand side of Table 5 , is a 170 basis point rise e stock price terms or D81 it is 144 basis points. Each ten percentage point rise in stock prices relative to earnings reduces the fed funds rate by about 24 basis points, according to the estimate. 29 The same tests were conduc using the log o in (t=0.24). Again a rise in stock prices is associated with a decline in the fed funds rate 29 When the level of the log of the PE ratio two years earlier is added to equation 3, comparable to the structure of equation 2, its coefficient, -1.612, is marginally insignificant (t = -2.00) and the contemporaneous first-difference is about the same (-2.680, t =-3.33 Fed reaction. But their analysis of the Fed reaction traces the effect of a stock price rise 30 When lags of the log of the S&P stock price index replace the earnings yield in equation 2, two gnificant lags of the level of the stock price measure (one year and two year lags) are significant and have 3.21). In this case, a lagged value of the stock price change has a significant positive effect on the federal 3 except that the initial negative effect of the stock price change is not significant (t = 0.01). The long the icate if any egative coefficient for stock prices and it is significant. They interpret the effect as a Greenspan-Fed effect, feeding (t s insignificant lags ranging from one to five months, but the contemporaneous term remains significant and negative in each case. It is likely that their insignificant negative result for the U.S. arises from the inclusion of several insignificant lagged effects of stock prices in the reported sum, just as would occur here. The interpretation of the negative coefficient on stock prices in Tatom (2002) , as here, is not that it represents a policy effort to feed bubbles, but rather reflects the future favorable inflation news in increased om si equal and opposite effects on the fed funds rate. The coefficient on the lagged change in the log of the stock price indicates that a one percent rise in stock prices raises the fed funds rate by 4.29 basis points (t = funds rate, contrary to the dynamics observed in equations 4. The result is similar to that in equations 2 and delay and other evidence above of a quicker response makes this temporary effect likely spurious. 31 The negative and insignificant discussed by Bernanke and Gertler (BG) is for the sum of effects over current and five past months. They do not report the contemporaneous or lagged effect, nor ind individual coefficients are significant and negative. Hayford and Malliaris (2001) also find a n the creation of a stock price bubble. Ending the estimation of equation 3 above in 1995 results in a coefficient on the stock price term that is slightly smaller in absolute value (-2.675) , but still significant = -2.08). In Tatom (2002), the same negative and significant effect of stock prices on the fed funds rate i observed using monthly data. There an insignificant sum, as in BG, is obtained for additions of current stock prices. BG also find a negative and significant stock price effect in Japan for the period fr 1979 through 1986:06, though this effect reverses in the 1990s.
on consumption spending and GDP and, via the latter, to a Fed reaction to an increase in the GDP gap, where the gap coefficient is aro und one. In this case, they argue, the Fed action would be 15 to 30 basis points. But this analysis does not suggest an doe o s ck pri chan such a framework. In fact, there is no significant correlation between the percentage change in the stock price and the change in the GDP gap at an annual frequency (r= 0.28, critical value = 0.31). The correlation coefficient for changes in the price-earnings ratio and in the gap is negative and also insignificant (-0.19).
Thus, it appears that the Rigoban and Sack evidence is consistent with the absence of past Even if the Fed could control equity prices in the long run, it would not be advisable.
32
32 Cecchetti et al. (2000) follow Smets (1997a Smets ( , 1997b in claiming a theoretical basis for a Fed reaction to stock prices. They examine three possible supply shocks to the asset and goods markets in Smets model. In only one of these will a Fed reaction to stock prices stabilize inflation. This shock is a permanent asset market shock that is unaccompanied by a goods market shock. An asset market shock that does not affect the goods market, and in a manner that offsets any inflation effect, is not easily imagined. In other cases, a ed reaction would not stabilize inflation. (Table 3) .
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The link between equity prices and monetary policy has become the subject of a rapidly growing literature due, in part, to the stellar performance of the U.S. equity market (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and subsequent bear market, coupled with the increased exposure of households to equity wealth and risk. Some policy analysts suggest that the Fed should target the equity price or at least take it into account in its efforts to stabilize inflation, prices or other objectives. This article provides evidence on many of the issues raised by proposals that the Fed could or should attempt to influence stock prices. It shows that reacting to stock prices is unnecessary and likely to be stabilizing. Reacting in the direction currently advocated by many would actually be perverse. First, there is no contemporaneous correlation between the real fed funds rate and the real yield on stocks implicit in the PE ratio, either in levels or first-differences from 1959-2000. A strong negative correlation between the federal funds rate and the PE ratio arises from the significant correlation the short run, that is given current and past
VI. Summary
33 In Tatom (2002) the real fed funds rate is found to be stationary in monthly data from 1954 to 2001. annual evidence should reveal long-run relationships less noisily, but the degrees of freedom in annual The data may technically be too small to allow rejection of a unit root. The implication of a stationary unit root is that policy cannot alter it in the long run. of each to inflation. This relationship is negative for the PE ratio and positive for the federal funds rate. Inflation also affects the relationship between stock prices and the funds rate found in simple causality tests, in times series evidence and in Fed reaction functions.
Simple causality tests favor a bi-directional relationship between the earnings yield and the nominal or real fed funds rate, but in each direction the relationship fed is exactly the pposite of that suggested by advocates of a stock price reaction. A rise in the fed funds stock prices and a rise in stock prices leads to a lower real fed funds rate after two years, though the latter effect is only significant if inflation is held constant by including it in the test equation. Controlling for inflation, the simple causality test equations show that the Fed cannot influence stock prices. The time series evidence supports the absence of a contemporaneous correlation, showing that a positive shock to the real fed funds rate has no initial effect on the stock price.
There is evidence of a strong positive long-run relationship between the earnings yield and the real federal funds rate and that the latter has error-correcting properties. The What about stock market bubbles? Even if they do not have adverse effects on inflation, they presumably affect ("distort") investment choices and the allocation of resources.
Can monetary policy be used to address them? The time series evidence shows that artificially low earnings yield, held down by a bubble, could be raised by a permanent shock to the real fed funds rate, but the required shock would be a decline in the real f funds rate, fostering inflation. The response of the bubble would come only with a fairly long lag. Moreover, the Fed cannot permanently lower the real fed funds rate according to the evidence here. At least in the short to medium term, the evidence here pro useful actions that could address bubbles. Longer term, actions to promote inflation could lower stock prices, but adjusted for the higher inflation, stock prices might still appear excessive. 
